jectives were to evaluate Kohlberg's theory of social-moral development from the crosscultural perspective of an Israeli kibbutz and to gain an understanding of the cultural uniqueness of kibbutz social-moral reasoning from the perspective of Kohlberg's theory.
The data presented, based on a sample of 92 kibbutz-born and Middle Eastern Israeli adolescents, are able to address these objectives for three reasons. First, it is a longitudinal study of moral reasoning, in contrast to most previous cross-cultural studies of moral development, which have been cross-sectional. These cross-cultural studies were reviewed by Edwards (1981 Edwards ( , 1982 and Snarey (1982 Snarey ( , 1984 . Second, the sample includes males and females in contrast to Kohlberg's original longitudinal study in the United States (Colby, Kohlbcrg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Kohlberg, 1958 Kohlberg, , 1981 and Nisan and Kohlberg's longitudinal study in Turkey, both of which included only males (Turiel, Edwards, & Kohlberg, 1978; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982) . Finally, the present study also attempts to replicate many of the same analyses that were performed in the United States and in Turkey, the two previous longitudinal studies that have used the standardized scoring system (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, Candee, et al., 1983 ). This will enable us to make specific comparisons among the samples and to begin to clarify the cross-cultural validity of Kohlberg's model and method.
Research Questions
This study considers six specific research questions. The first three apply conventional psychological indicators of reliability and validity to Kohlberg's theory. To what degree does the development of moral reasoning in a kibbutz population, as measured by Kohlberg's instrument, follow the same patterns as shown by other populations who have been studied? The second three apply anthropological methods to Kohlberg's theory. To what degree is the moral reasoning of kibbutzniks different from that of people from other cultures?
Developmental Questions 1. Stage sequence. The invariant-secluence assumption of Kohlberg's moral development theory should be supported by the combined results of the blind-scored longitudinal data. Stage change should be upward and sequential and stage regressions should not be found beyond the level explainable by scoring error (cf. Broughton, 1978; Kohlberg, 1984; Kurtines & Grief, 1974) .
2. Structural wholeness. Structural wholeness is a critical empirical criterion of construct validity. The internal consistency of the model and measure was previously established for subjects in the United States, using the standard scoring manual (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, Candee, et al., 1983; Kohlberg, 1981) . A replication of their analyses on the kibbutz longitudinal data should yield similar findings.
3. Age norms and stages. Moral judgment can be expected to be positively correlated with age, as developmental theory suggests and previous research has found. The age norms among kibbutz subjects will also be compared with the findings from previous research.
Cultural Questions
4. Culturally defined sex differences. Moral development among kibbutzniks should not yield sex differences. Structural-developmental theory's claim to universality is not consistent with inherent sex differences in the structure of moral reasoning. From an anthropological perspective, however, the general equality of sex roles in the community's socialization process also suggests that sex differences in the level of moral development should not be expected among kibbutz subjects. That is, although the issue of sex difference in moral judgment is a topic of current debate (Gilligan, 1977 (Gilligan, , 1982 , we would argue that sex differences will not be found unless culturally defined sex roles assign different educational and social rights to males and females. Because kibbutz ideology stresses equality of sex roles, at least as an ideal, we would anticipate that there would not be sex differences in the development of moral reasoning among kibbutzniks.
5. Culturally defined moral issues. There may be culturally based differences in choices that subjects make regarding what issue or content within a dilemma that they will consider the most important. Each of Kohlberg's dilemmas requires the subject to make a content choice between two moral issues (e.g., to steal or not to steal the drug). From an ethnographic perspective, one might expect Middle Eastern Youth Aliyah students to more commonly favor particular kinds of action (such as upholding the law and authority) that reflect the content of moral reasoning stressed in their culture and families, whereas kibbutz-born subjects might be expected to more commonly select other choices (e.g., upholding conscience, life, contract). This difference between the two groups, if it exists, would also be expected to decrease as Youth Aliyah students spend more time on ,the kibbutz.
6. Culturally defined moral structures. Another aspect of the cultural uniqueness question, aside from content differences, is the possibility that the scoring manual simply misses or misunderstands particular structures of moral reasoning because of cultural differences between the subject and theoretician (cf. Bloom, 1977; Simpson, 1974) . We as- sessed the cultural uniqueness of stage formulations by examining interview material that the scorers indicated was difficult to score. This material was analyzed for patterns that relate to kibbutz norms and values.
Method

Samples
Kibbutzim are intentionally created collective communities in Israel characterized by communal childrearin~ collective economic production, and direct participatory democracy. The kibbutz under study, which we will call Ramat Yedidim, was founded in 1949 in the northern Galilean hills by a group of young Jewish men and women who had grown up in the Young Guard (Hashomer Hatzair) Youth Movement.
Kibbutz Ramat Yedidim's educational system, in general, is typical of the approach of other kibbutzim within the National Kibbutz Federation (Kibbutz Artzi), the Federation most loyal to the traditional approach to structuring a kibbutz living environment. Small agegraded peer groups (kvutzot) live together in their own houses from infancy until 18, when they enter the army. Each of these cohorts is given a name that serves some of the same identification functions as a family surname in the United States, although they also have family surnames. Each cohort of children has one or more fulltime teachers who guide their formal education and also a house-parent or caretaker (metapeiet), who is responsible for directing and socializing the children in the communal living and work activities of the children's house. Because, to a limited degree, their peers are experienced as their family and their educators as parental figures, there is an unusual unity to their educational, work, and social experience. Kibbutz Ramat Yedidim has, however, modified an element of the traditional kibbutz movement's approach to educating adolescents in that they fully integrate city-born youth into the kibbutz educational system. Most of these youth are so-called Middle Eastern Jews (i.e., their parents immigrated to Israel from the Arab countries), and they also come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. A group of these 12 to 13-ycar-olds are brought to the kibbutz, through the services of the Youth Aliyah organization, and after a year are fully integrated with a parallel cohort of kibbutz-born youth. This new cohort of kibbutz-born and city-born are educated and live together until early adulthood (cf. Kohlberg & Bar-Yam, 1971; Reimer, 1977; Snarey, 1982) .
The 92 adolescents in this study are divided into four subsamples, each of which corresponds to a kibbutz cohort. (See Table 1 .) Each subsample of kibbutz-educated students includes both kibbutz-born and city-born adolescents. The subjects in all four subsamples were residing at Kibbutz Ramat Yedidim, with the following two exceptions: Subsample 1 was supplemented with kibbutzborn subjects from Kibbutz F and with two groups of city-born and city-educated youth; Subsample 2 was supplemented with a group of city-born kibbutz-educated youth from Kibbutz M.
Research Instrument
Kohlberg's moral judgment interview, Form A, was used to collect the longitudinal data on moral development. The three dilemmas in Form A are as follows: III, the classic Heinz dilemma, involving a husband's conflict between the issues of life versus law; III', the Brown dilemma, involving a court judge's conflict between conscience versus punishment; and dilemma I, the Joe dilemma, involving a father-son conflict between contract versus authority. Each dilemma is followed by 9 to 12 standardized probe questions designed to clarify the reasons "why" a subject has made a particular moral judgment.
The dilemmas and probe questions were translated into Hebrew and were also modified slightly for use with kibbutz subjects, for example, U.S. dollars became Israeli pounds, Heinz became Moshe, and so forth.
Data-Collection Procedure
The subjects were interviewed individually in Hebrew. Each interview was conducted privately, tape-recorded, and later transcribed. Moral judgment interviews were collected from the entire cohort shortly al~r a group of Youth Aliyah students arrived at Kibbutz Ramat Yedidim or shortly after the Youth Aliyah group was integrated with the parallel group of kibbutz-born subjects. All subjects in a particular subsarnple were then reintcrvicwed 1 or 2 years later and again 5 years later. For some kibbutz cohorts a city-residing comparison group was also interviewed. The interview schedule, according to both sample subgroups and frequency of interview, is presented in Table 2 . The frequency of the longitudinal follow-up interviews may be summarized as follows: 32 subjects were interviewed 3 times each for a total of 96 interviews, 32 subjects were interviewed 2 times for a total of 64 interviews, and 28 subjects were interviewed only once. Thus, taken together, there was a total of 188 interviews from 92 subjects.
Scoring and Analysis
Moral judgment interviews. Moral development interviews were scored ufing the new Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, Candee, et ai., 1983) . 
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This standardized scoring method yielded two indexes of moral development: a global stage score and a moral maturity score. The global stage score is a categorical stage assessment that was calculated on a 9-point scale (1, 1/2, 2 .... 5). The moral maturity score is a continuous stage assessment that can range from 100 to 500.
To assign each of the 188 interviews in this study a global stage score and a moral maturity score, they were divided and distributed randomly to three expert scorers, one of whom was a co-author of the scoring manual. All interviews were scored blind from English transcripts, that is, without knowing the subject's name, age, sex, cohort membership, time of testing, or scores assigned to other interviews. To assess interrater reliability, 20 interviews were selected randomly and scored independently by all three scorers. Comparing the level of agreement between the global stage scores, we found that in 65% to 70% of the cases an interview received the exact same score from any two scorers. In 95% of the cases, the interview received the exact same or within one-half of a stage score from all three scorers. The mean reliability between all three scorers was estimated to be .89 for the categorical global stage scores and .91 for the continuous moral maturity scores. To assess the translation reliability, seven interviews were also randomly selected for independent scoring in Hebrew by a bilingual scorer. The interrater correlation was .84 for the global stage scores, and .93 for continuous scores. Translating the interviews, therefore, did not significantly alter the scoring reliability.
Findings and Analysis
Developmental Findings
The findings from the four samples will be combined in order to evaluate the degree to which they support Hypotheses 1 to 3 regarding the basic theoretical assumptions of Kohlberg's developmental model and the reliability of the new scoring method. The results will also be compared with findings from the two previous longitudinal moral development studies---one in the United States and one in Turkey--that have used the standardized scoring manual.
Developmental sequence and regressions.
According to Kohlberg, developmental sequence or stage change should be consecutive and upward, that is, without regressions or omissions. Table 3 summarizes the types of stage change that occurred in the interval from time n to time n + 1 among the 64 longitudinal subjects.
As an examination of Table 3 indicates, small amounts of regression occurred in 6 out of 96 longitudinal interviews (6.3%) using the customary 9-point scale, and regressions Note. The actual raw scores for each subject may be examined in Snarey (1982) .
occurred in 7 out of 96 cases using the most differentiated 13-point scale. To evaluate this finding, previous test-retest reliability data can be used as an estimate of the number of such deviations that can be attributed to measurement error. Colby and Kohlberg have reported test-retest error for the Form A interview to be 19%. They also report that the longitudinal regressions in the United States were 5% for the Form A interview using the 9-point scale and 7% using the 13-point "scale and thus conclude that because the test-retest reversals are well over twice as great as the longitudinal reversals, it seemed reasonable to attribute the violations of longitudinal sequence to measurement error 0983). One might add, of course, that some of the nonreversals might also be due to measurement error, but it still seems reasonable to conclude that the assumptions regarding developmental sequence and regressions are supported by the kibbutz findings because the percentage of violations of the longitudinal sequence in this kibbutz longitudinal study was nearly identical to the finding in the United States longitudinal study. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that in no case did a longitudinal subject completely skip a stage. Each subject reached his or her highest stage at his last interview time by going through each of the preceding intermediate stages between his first and last interview stage scores. Structural wholeness. Kohlberg has suggested that, in addition to invariant sequence, the most critical empirical criterion of construct validity is "structural wholeness" or internal consistency. This refers to the generality of stage usage across moral issues and dilemmas within the interview.
One indication that a stage forms a structured whole would be the degree to which any particular individual reasoned at the same stage at any one interview time. Each subject's stage usage in percentage is presented elsewhere (Snarey, 1982) . The 188 interview profiles indicate that in 156 (83%) of the cases all reasoning was at one major stage or in transition between two adjacent stages, and 32 (17%) of the cases included reasoning at three adjacent stages. In no case was a subject reasoning at two nonadjacent stages. To analyze such interviews with three stages represented, Colby and Kohlberg have previously established a conservative error boundary of 10% with entries of .10 and below treated as error and entries above .10 treated as real (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, Candee, et al., 1983) . Applying this formula, 16 or 8.5% of the 188 interviews exhibit reasoning at three stages. This is comparable to the U.S. longitudinal study in which 9% of the interviews exhibited reasoning at three adjacent stages, though the stage range is narrower in the current study.
Another procedure for evaluating the structural-wholeness claim is to examine the correlations among the stage scores for each of the six issues that make up the global or overall interview score. A correlation matrix for the entire sample is presented in Table 4 . Consistent with Kohlberg's assumptions, the correlations were all positive, significant, and moderately high (.745 to .422) . If the structural-wholeness hypothesis is correct, one would also expect to find one major factor, not several factors, accounting for the major portion of the variability. The factor loadings and principal components analysis for three age groupings (12 to 15, 16 to !9, 20 to 26) on all six moral issues were thus examined. The first factor accounts for 79% to 100% of the variance, with eigenvalues of 3.49, 2.88, and 2.74. The second factor's eigenvalue is always less than 1 for each age group and for the sample as a whole. Nevertheless, to consider the possibility ofa multifactoral solution, the factors were rotated. Again, using a varimax (orthagonal) rotated factor matrix, no underlying consistent pattern is interpretable across the factors. Thus, in summary, the eigenvalue and proportion of variance were predominately accounted for by only one general factor, and rotation of multiple factors did not yield any consistent pattern across the factors. The structural-wholeness hypothesis, therefore, cannot be rejected; the findings suggest that there is a general dimension of moral reasoning that is not issue-specific. These findings are also dearer than those from the U.S. study, in which the second eigenvalue was greater than 1 0.05 to 2.05) for similar age groups.
Age norms and moral stage. Moral development would be expected to show a clear relationship with age. The actual relationship between age and moral stage can be summarized by observing the mean and range of stages for each age. Stage 2/3 was the lowest commonly assigned stage, 61% of the subjects at age 12 were assigned this stage. No kibbutz subject aged 18 or over scored at Stage 2/3. Stage 3 was the model stage for ages 13 to 14 and 15 to 17. No one in the 13 to 17 group scored higher than Stage 3/4. Stage 3/ 4 was assigned to 62 (33%) of the interviews and was the model stage for the 18 to 26 age groups. Stage 4 was assigned to l0 (5%) of the interviews; it did not appear until the 18 to 19 age group, at which time 14.3% of this cohort was assigned Stage 4. Stage 4/5 also appears for the first time in the 18 to 19 age group, but it does not become common until the 24 to 26 age group. Stages 4/5 and 5 thus appear to be confirmed on the kibbutz as stages of adulthood and not of adolescence.
In sum, the mean moral maturity scores gradually and consistently increased from 278 at age 12 to 377 at ages 24 to 26. A regression analysis indicated that age accounts for 40% of the variance in moral maturity scores.
As Table 5 indicates, the Israeli sample's age norms compare favorably with the findings from the two previous longitudinal stud- Another dimension of the relationship between age and stage is the stability of individual differences, that is, the relationship between a subject's score at one age with the same subject's score at a later age. The correlations among moral maturity scores for the different ages were thus examined. The correlations between moral maturity scores at one age with scores at a later age were positive but not always high or significant. The highest correlation within our sample was between scores at ages 15 to 17 and scores at the adjoining 18 to 19 age range (.75, p < .05), but scores at ages 13 to 14 were the best general predictors of scores in later adolescence and early adulthood (.48 with scores at ages 15 to 17, .49 with scores at ages 18 to 19, and .56 with scores at ages 20 to 23). Kohlberg and Colby's longitudinal study in the United States also found that scores at ages 13 to 14 were better predictors of later stages, presumably because this age represents a period of stabilization after entering adolescence. The correlations reported by Colby and Kohlberg between scores at age 13 to 14 with later ages were generally higher than was found in the present study (.70 with scores at ages 16 to 18, .46 with ages 20 to 22, .70 at ages 24 to 26, and .67 at ages 28 to 30).
Cultural Findings
The findings reported in the previous section supported the developmental assumptions underlying Kohlberg's theory and have lent support to arguments for the cross-cultural universality of Kohlberg's model as well as his method of studying moral judgment. They have not spoken, however, to the cross-cultural particularity of moral reasoning among kibbutzniks. This section will focus on the cultural content of moral reasoning and the ways in which the cultural characteristics of kibbutz moral reasoning may be different.
Culturally defined sex differences. One assumption of structural developmental theory is that there will not be sex differences in the structure of moral reasoning. Yet some researchers have argued that there are sex differences in moral judgment (Gilligan, 1977 (Gilligan, , 1982 .
The cross-tabulation of sex by global stage for all cohorts that included both male and female subjects (i.e., samples 2, 3, and 4) indicated that the association between sex and moral stage scores is weak and not significant [X 2 (3, N = 134) = 4.65, p = ns]. (See Table 6 .) The relationship between sex and specific moral stages can be further examined by considering the percentage of reasoning at each stage for males and females. This information is presented in Table 7 . Sex and stage usage are cross-tabulated for each stage. The strength of the association between sex and percentage using a particular stage is always weak (V ranged from .16 to .25), and the sexes do not differ significantly in the percentages to which they use any of the stages. Possible sex differences in stage of moral judgment were also considered separately for kibbutz-born males and females and for Middle Eastern aliyah youth males and females because of the variation in their cultural backgrounds in terms of the distribution of sex roles. The relationship between stage and sex for the kibbutz-born youth at their first and last interview times was examined as was the relationship between stage and sex for the aliyah youth at their first and last interview times. The analyses for the kibbutz-born Table 8 .) Note. x 2 (3, N = 4,65), p = ns, V = .19.
In sum, there were no significant sex differences in moral judgment for the age groups under study, controlling for cultural background, stage usage, and interview time.
Culturally defined moral issues. For each of the moral dilemmas included in each interview, the subject is first asked to make a choice between two alternative moral actions that should be taken in the dilemma. These alternative actions are referred to as issue choices because each is based on one of two different moral issues that are in conflict. The classic Heinz dilemma, for instance, requires a choice between life versus law. The Officer Brown dilemma represents a conflict between morality and conscience versus punishment, and the Joe dilemma presents a conflict between contract versus authority.
The possibility that these issues are related to the cultural differences was considered. For instance, one might expect kibbutz subjects to more commonly choose the life, conscience, or contract issues, whereas the more traditional Middle Eastern aliyah youth might be expected to more commonly choose the law, punishment, and authority issues. This possible cultural difference in issue choice was examined for both cultural groups at different ages in order to compare their issue choices when the Middle Eastern aliyah youth first came to the kibbutz and again 5 to 7 years later after being kibbutz-educated.
With regard to the issue choices for the Heinz dilemma, the kibbutz-born and aliyah youth do not differ at ages 12 to 15, at ages 15 to 17, or at their final interview at ages 18 to 26. On average, kibbutz-born (96%) and Middle Eastern youth (94%) nearly always choose the life issue and advocate that the drug be stolen to save the woman's life. For the Officer Brown dilemma, again the groups do not differ at any of the age intervals; on average the conscience issue is the slight favorite for both groups (55% and 63%). Looking at the father-son dilemma, however, the Middle Eastern aliyah youth are less likely to choose the contract issue than are the kibbutz-born subjects. At ages 12 to 15 the trend is not significant at the .05 level, but the trend becomes stronger and reaches significance among the 15-to 17-year-olds, X: (1, N = 35) = 3.98, p < .05, Phi = .40. The Middle Eastern youth, both on the kibbutz and in the city, often choose the authority issue (i.e., give the father the money) in spite of the unfairness of the father's request. The kibbutz-born youth always choose the contract issue (i.e., the father must keep his promise). In hindsight, this particular dilemma seems the most likely to capture the different cultural origins of the groups. Kibbutz children tend to find the fact that the father has broken his promise and asked for his son's money to be amazing within the context of the kibbutz childrearing and economic system. Middle Eastern youth, on the other hand, could be expected to find it more reasonable to give in to the father's request within the context of the Middle Eastern patriarchal family system, which emphasizes parental respect and authority. By the time of the final interview, after 5 to 9 years of kibbutz residence, the difference between kibbutz-born and aliyah youth has completely disappeared and both nearly always choose the contract issue (i.e., don't give the father the money).
Because all of the subjects in the age range for which differences in issue choices were found were also reasoning at the conventional stages, it appears that their choices were guided by the different conventional norms of their subcultures. This is further suggested by observing the frequency with which the Israeli subjects drew upon specific culturally defined values and norms from the social institutions to which they belonged in order to justify or support their moral judgments. That is, reference to kibbutz democratic and family norms, Israeli legal and military protocols, Jewish religious and ethnic values parallel the above issue choice patterns. The number of cultural references made by the 12-to 14-year-old subjects in both the kibbutz-born and Youth Aliyah cohorts was quite low (M = 6%), and these subjects also had the highest use of preconventional reasoning. Among the older subjects, however, the number of references to social institutions rose dramatically, with an average of 50% of the 15-to 17-year-old and 40% of the 18-to 26-year-old subjects supporting their moral reasoning by referring to specific social institutions.
In sum, no significant differences between kibbutz-born and non-kibbutz-born youth were found on the Heinz dilemma or on the Officer Brown dilemma, but a culturally comprehensible difference was found on the father-son dilemma among the 15-to 17-year-olds. These findings contrast somewhat with the results of Colby and Kohlberg's United States study (1983) , because in their sample 67% of the Americans argued that Heinz should steal the drug, compared to 95% of the kibbutz subjects; 45% of their American sample argued for leniency in the Officer Brown dilemma, compared to 55% of the kibbutz-born youth; and 61% of their sample argued that the father must keep his promise, compared to 93% in the kibbutzborn sample. In each case, the kibbutz subjects are more likely to choose what Kohlberg has termed the principled response, and the differences remain essentially the same when age and stage of development are controlled. The kibbutz findings are also in contrast with the results of Nisan and Kohlberg's Turkish study (1982) , which found the opposite pattern: In their sample Turkish village subjects were significantly more likely than Turkish city subjects to choose the law issue in the Heinz dilemma and the punishment issue in the Officer Brown dilemma, but there were no significant differences on the father-son dilemma. Nisan and Kohlberg's discussion, however, similarly accounts for these differences in terms of subcultural differences between the two groups. The next section will consider cultural differences among kibbutzniks as they relate to the higher stages of moral development.
Culturally defined postconventional morality. Another aspect of the cultural-uniqueness question can be assessed by examining the interview material that the scorers considered to be difficult to evaluate in terms of stage structure. Occasionally the reason a subject gives for prescribing a particular moral action cannot be matched with a structural example in the scoring manual. Under these circumstances, the scorer assigns a "guess" score to the judgment, and it is included, but weighted less, in the scoring algorithm. Such difficult material, especially within cross-cultural interviews, may indicate aspects of moral reasoning that the stage model and scoring manual miss or misunderstand because they were created from interviews collected in the United States (cf. Price-Williams, 1975; Cole et al., 1971) .
Systematic examination of the guess-scored material at the conventional stages reveals that the items are usually unclear because of the briefness or incompleteness of that particular judgment by the subject. The higher stage judgments that are difficult to score, however, are not only usually complete judg-ments but also appear to be culturally patterned around the cooperative and collective working-class values of the kibbutz (cf. Snarey, 1982; Snarey & Blasi, 1980 
Excerpt 1 (Kibbutz female):
Q. It is against the law for Moshe to steal the drug.
Does that make it morally wrong? A. It will be illegal or against the formal law, but not against the law which is the moral law. Again, if we were in a utopian society, my hierarchy of values, and the hierarchy of others through consensus, would be realized. Q. What are those values? A. Socialism! But (laughter) don't ask me to explain it. Q. What is wrong with a nonsocialistic society that makes it unjust? A. In a utopia there will be all the things I believe in.
There would not be murder, robbery, and everyone will be equal. In this society, [he greatest value, the value of life, is perfectly held. Disvaluing life is forbidden. It is like our dream, our ideal. In one way it is ridiculous since this utopia will never be achieved, of course. You can even observe children in the kindergarten; they can be very nasty and cruel to each other. Q. Should people still do everything they can to obey the law in an imperfect world? A. Yes, unless it will endanger or hurt another important value .... But generally speaking, people should obey the law. The law was created in order to protect.., from killing, robbery, and other unjust uses of power .... I believe everyone has the right to self-growth and the right to reach happiness .... People are not born equally genetically, and it is not fair that one who is stronger physically should reach his happiness by whatever means at the expense of one who is weaker, because the right to happiness is a basic human right of every person and equal to all. A nonkibbutz society that is based on power negates the right and possibility of those who are weaker to get their happiness. In scoring these excerpts as guess Stage 4 or 4/5, the scorer made two judgments: (a) there was not a clear match example in the scoring manual by which to evaluate these judgments, and (b) clinically, these statements seem to be at least Stage 4, but they do not seem to be fully postconventional Stage 5 judgments. Because the subjects do appear to be arguing for the maintenance of the social system, it seems reasonable, in the absence of material in the scoring manual, that these excerpts were so scored. Yet, we would argue that there is a clear sense in which the collective equality and happiness perspective common to these interviews is more mature than Kohlberg's definition of Stage 4 and should be included as a type of Stage 5 reasoning. One notes that the kibbutz functions for the subjects as an imperfect embodiment of a more utopian ideal. Furthermore, in commonly making the assertion that the whole community or kibbutz should control the drug, they are making a solid Stage 5 judgment to the extent that they view community membership as based on a commitment to collective equality and the aim of cooperative happiness. Allusions in some interviews to the social system becoming dysfunctional are also not necessarily conventional judgments if the reason they are protecting the social system is because they see it as ideally embodying universal moral principles. The clear recognition by the subjects that the kibbutz does not fully meet these ideals also supports our assumption of the autonomous use of moral principles that are prior to a social perspective. A more culturally sensitive scoring of the excerpts presented above would thus have assigned a score of Stage 5 to these interviews. Such a culturally sensitive scoring would not, however, have drastically increased the number of Stage 5 interviews in the sample. Although the current stage distribution included three young adults who scored at Stage 4/5, the above considerations would have increased the number to five interviews scored as fully Stage 5.
Summary Conclusion
The moral development of 92 adolescents in Israel was studied with the aim of evaluating the cross-cultural validity of Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral judgment. The research questions both focused on the degree to which the moral development of kibbutzniks is like that of all other people and on possible culturally defined variations in moral development between kibbutz and other populations.
Developmental Universality of Moral Judgment
The longitudinal findings indicated that stage change was consecutive, gradual, and upward. The number of stage regressions was not higher than one would expect due to scoring error, and in no case did a subject skip a stage. Colby and Kohlberg's analyses regarding structural wholeness and internal consistency were also replicated. The 188 interview profiles indicated that in 83% of the cases all reasoning was at one major stage or in transition between two adjacent stages. The correlations among the stage scores for each of the six moral issues within each interview were all positive, significant, and moderately high. Finally, the eigenvalue and proportion of variance were predominately accounted for by only one general factor.
Age showed a clear relationship with stage and accounted for 40% of the variance in moral maturity score. The age norms compare favorably with the findings from the two previous longitudinal studies that have used the standardized scoring system. The range of stages is from 2 to 4/5, compared to a range of 1 to 4/5 in the United States and Turkey. Furthermore, the kibbutz mean stage scores at all ages are consistently higher than the mean stage scores in the United States and Turkey. This distribution of the kibbutz stage scores is also impressive when one considers that previous research has found that children in rural communities generally progress more slowly than city children (Edwards, 1975; Turiel, 1969, p. 125 ). Yet in all studies to date, Stages 4/5 and 5 have been relatively rare: 8 subjects in the United States (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983) , 18 kibbutz founders in Israel (Snarey, 1982) , 1 subject in Turkey (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982) , and 3 kibbutz youth in the present study.
Regarding the stability of individual differences, Colby and Kohlberg had found that scores at ages 13 to 14 were the best predictors of later stages. The finding from the United States was replicated in Israel, although the correlations between scores at age 13 to 14 with later scores were generally lower in this present study than had been the case in the United States.
Cultural Variation in Moral Judgment
There were no significant differences in development between males and females in stage scores. Controlling for cultural background, interview time and age also did not reveal any significant sex differences.
Regarding the content of moral reasoning, there were no significant differences in moralissue choice between kibbutz and nonkibbutz subjects in moral-issue choice on the Heinz dilemma or the Officer Brown dilemma, but there was a culturally comprehensible differenee on the father-son dilemma among the 15-to 17-year-olds. The kibbutz-born youth nearly always made the contract choice and argued that the father should keep his promise while the Middle Eastern youth often chose the authority issue and argued that the son should give his father the money. The 15-to 17-year-old subjects were more likely to draw on culturally defined values and norms from the social institutions to which they belonged in order to justify their moral judgments. In essence, the youngest age cohorts, whose members were primarily at the preconventional stages, seldom reflected cultural conventions in their reasoning; the middle 15 to 17 age cohorts, whose members were primarily at the conventional stages, were significandy more likely to make moral choices that reflected the conventions of their society; finally, for the oldest cohorts, whose members had begun to make greater use of the less convention-bound stages 4 and 4/5, there was again a drop in the use of or conformity to conventions.
Culturally defined structural variations in kibbutz postconventional reasoning were suggested by an analysis of interview material that the scorers had labeled as difficult to score. The kibbutzniks' communal emphasis, greater investment in the preservation of social solidarity, and greater emphasis upon collective happiness seem to have been missed or misunderstood when evaluated strictly by the standardized scoring manual. Five interviews that were rated as Stage 4 or 4/5 under the standardized scoring procedure were evaluated as Stage 5 under a culturally sensitive second scoring. This suggests that the scoring manual needs to be revised in two ways. First, culturally indigenous examples of reasoning at the higher stages need to be added to avoid bias when considering the content of reasoning by subjects from a cultural background other than the one of the original subjects on which the manual was based. Since it is not possible for one scoring manual to contain the universe of cultural variation, this first point also underscores the importance of the researcher being thoroughly immersed in the culture of the population under study. Second, and more interestingly, there appear to be postconventional moral principles other than those commonly held by mature middle class Westerners. There is thus a need for a more pluralistic understanding of Stage 5 if scorers are to validly estimate the development of moral reasoning in diverse cultural settings.
In conclusion, Kohlberg's model and method have fared well: the kibbutz findings are remarkably consistent with a structural understanding of the development of moral reasoning. The data, however, also revealed some degree of cultural uniqueness in the moral judgments of kibbutzniks. These findings should be seen, of course, as only one part of a broader investigation of the validity of Kohlberg's theory within diverse cultural settings.
